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The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Law:
The Philosophical Origins and Differences




Almost all countries deem it necessary to draw up a constitu-
tion,' to describe in a hierarchical fashion the major institutions of
government, and to establish the methods by which power is to be
exercised. To many states, the constitution is a symbol of na-
tionhood.2 In newly emergent nations, however, (particularly those
finding themselves free from colonial rule), the constitution is used to
articulate a new emerging order.'
The origins of modern constitutions are thus attributed to a de-
sire by the people to make a fresh start. This requires an outline of
the new form of government.' A constitution is especially important
to a nation state in its infant stages. In this context, constitutions
provide the rational legal basis for the present order.
This article will examine the philosophical notions of a constitu-
tion and a state system from a historical perspective. It will highlight
the different philosophical bases of state law and the purpose the
constitution is meant to serve under the two divergent orders. The
approach will be descriptive and comparative. The purpose of this
work is not (in the words of Christopher Osakwe) to pass off a politi-
cal opinion5 about the desirability of one or the other legal systems.
* Education: B.A., LL.B., University of Natal; LL.M., Northwestern University. Ad-
junct Professor, Northwestern University School of Law.
I. H. SPIRO, GOVERNMENT BY CONSTITUTION: THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF DEMOCRACY
11-2 (1959).
2. C. FRIEDRICH. CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY 584 (1968) [herein-
after C. FRIEDRICH].
3. Loewenstein, Reflections on the value of Constitutions in our Revolutionery Age, in
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 149 (H. Eckstein and D. Apter ed. 1968).
4. See K. WHEARE, MODERN CONSTITUTIONS 6 (1960) [hereinafter K. WHEARE]. Pro-
fessor Wheare refers to the U.S. Constitution of 1787, the U.S.S.R. Constitution of 1917, and
the French Constitution of 1946. See also, I. KOVACS, NEw ELEMENTS IN THE EVOLUTION OF
SOCIALIST CONSTITUTION 12 (1968) [hereinafter 1. KOVACS].
5. Osakwe, Introduction: The Greening of Socialist Law As An Academic Discipline, 61
TUL. L. REV. 1261 (1987) [hereinafter Osakwe].
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Instead, the essential focus will be to examine the jurisprudence un-
derlying the constitutional systems, and the different uses that con-
stitutions perform in the two orders. In a sense, the study proceeds
from a level of abstraction.'
To some extent, the drawing up of constitutions (under both or-
ders) is related to providing a moral and legal basis for the way
power is to be exercised, i.e., to provide a basis for legitimacy.7 The
legitimacy problem involves the extent to which the system can en-
gender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions
are the most appropriate for the society.8 The question of legitimacy
(whether the people believe the existing arrangements are the most
appropriate) lies at the heart of any debate on constitutions and the
exercise of power.' Many political systems experience a crisis be-
cause of the failure to surmount the difficulties of legitimacy. At
times, what may be seen to be an inherently unjust system may con-
tinue to enjoy support, because the beliefs in the system may be
falsely grounded in some mystification.
The basis of this legitimacy varies between the principles of nat-
ural law, or what is considered "the natural order of things" under
western systems, and the "rights of the working class" in communist
systems. However, both systems ultimately claim their power from
the people. 10
II. What is a Constitution?
Some commentators view constitution-making as a science, and
if the correct structural principles are employed, freedom and justice
will materialize. 1 This calls for an explanation of what a constitu-
tion is meant to achieve in a particular order. There is a dichotomy
in thinking between the western and socialist bloc countries as to
whether a constitution is associated with a normative system, or
whether it is purely a set of rules regulating government functions
and agencies. The way in which law is viewed, and the place it is
given in society affects the society in terms of its social aspirations. 2
6. It has to be emphasized at the outset that the philosophical basis of a system very
often contrasts with the reality which is not the focus of this inquiry.
7. G. MOSCA, THE RULING CLASS 70 (H. Kahn trans. 1939). Mosca argues that the
ruling class do not justify their exercise of power by mere possession of it, but try to formulate
a moral and legal basis for it.
8. Lipset, Social Conflict, Legitimacy, and Democracy, in LEGITIMACY AND THE STATE
88 (W. ConollV ed. 1984) [hereinafter LEGITIMACY AND THE STATE].
9. For a detailed discussion on the concept of legitimacy, see id.
10. A reading of nearly all constitutions shows that they usually begin with the phrase
or statement claiming power from the people.
II. 5 HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE: GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS AND
PROCESSES I (F. Greenstein and N. Polsby ed. 1975) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE].
12. I. HARDEN & N. LEWIS, THE NOBLE LIE: THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION AND THE
[Vol. 8:2
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There is a popular currency in the liberal theory to view law
and the institutions of the state as neutral frameworks. In this com-
parative study it will become apparent that there is an interplay be-
tween constitutional legal theory and the institutions of state and so-
cial policies."8 Under the liberal paradigm it appears to be less overt,
where as under the communist systems the notion of state law and
the institutions of state having a separate and neutral existence is
expressly rejected.
A. Constitutional Law and Constitutionalism in a Liberal Political
System
Today, some Western constitutional lawyers make a distinction
between constitutions and constitutionalism to reflect the dichotomy
in interpretation with respect to whether a constitution is merely a
legal document, or whether it is meant to reflect a normative order.
The term constitution is used more in the sense of describing the
codes and rules which allocate and regulate the functions, duties and
powers of the various government agencies, the officers of the gov-
ernment and the relationship between these elements and the pub-
lic. 4 In the above sense the term constitution is not used in an
overtly prescriptive sense, but more as a set of rules to regulate the
system of government.' Many academics still view a constitutional
system in a stereotypical manner associating it with a highly norma-
tive system, particular institutional frameworks, and the protection
of individual and property rights.' 6 However, the distinction between
constitutions and constitutionalism can become blurred. The western
constitutional lawyer's measurement of a constitution is invariably
weighed against the principles of constitutionalism, and when he re-
fers to a constitution he in fact really means constitutionalism. In the
words of one author, the constitution is both the symbol and instru-
ment of constitutionalism.17
B. The Core Principles of Constitutionalism
Constitutionalism is clearly linked to a set of political ideals.
Some commentators have equated the difference between constitu-
tions which conform to the principles of constitutionalism, and those
RULE OF LAW 16 (1986) [hereinafter I. HARDEN & N. LEWIS].
13. Id. at 16.
14. FIVE CONSTITUTIONS 15 (S. Finer ed. 1979).
15. K. WHEARE, supra note 4, at 1.
16. Sartori, Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion, LVI: THE AMERICAN POLITI-
CAL SCIENCE REVIEW 853-9 (1962).
17. B. NWABUEZE, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE EMERGENT STATES 23 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter B. NWABUEZE].
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that do not as the heart of the cold war.18 The core principle of con-
stitutionalism is the limitation of government power and the guaran-
teeing of individual and civil liberties enforceable by the courts.19 In
essence, constitutional government is "limited government." The lim-
its imposed on the government are of two kinds. First, the powers of
government authority are restricted. Second, the procedure the gov-
ernment is to follow in exercising its functions is spelled out.2 0 The
control or limitation of government can be effected in several ways.
First, constitutionalism is associated with certain forms of insti-
tutional arrangements operating on the premise that there are cer-
tain demonstrable relationships between institutional forms and the
attainment of certain values.21 The issue is presented as an ongoing
contradiction between the government and the people. Power is in
the hands of the government and the power has to be brought under
control. The judiciary is the main agency for exercising this con-
trol.22 An independent judiciary constitutes the pivotal point in the
institutional arrangements under constitutionalism.
Consequently, the first important aspect of constitutionalism, in
respect to the institutional arrangements, is the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers. The doctrine of separation of powers can be traced
back to the writings of Montesquieu who argued that the way to
control power is to fragment it; Montesquieu advocated the classifi-
cation and division of government power into a legislative, executive
and judicial branch. 3 Some writers link the doctrine to the notion of
checks and balances, while others view it as an institutional arrange-
ment of limiting government.2 4 The notion of checks and balances
seeks to make the separation of power effective by balancing the
power of one agency against that of the other. The strict notion of
separation of powers stands for the complete separation of the agen-
cies of government. The separation is to operate at the institutional
level and in the composition of the personnel. 5 Despite different in-
18. C. FRIEDERICH, LIMITED GOVERNMENT: A COMPARISON 37 (1974).
19. See B. NWABUEZE, supra note 17, at 1, 10; K. WHEARE, supra note 4, at 137; D.
COWEN, THE FOUNDATIONS OF FREEDOM 197 (1961).
20. Andrews, Constitutionalism and Constitutions, in CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITU-
TIONALISM 13 (W.G. Andrews ed. 1961) [hereinafter Andrews].
21. M. VILE. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 8 (1967) [hereinaf-
ter M. VILE].
22. HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, supra note 11, at 36.
23. Harlow, Power from the People? Representation and Constitutional Theory, MOD-
ERN LEGAL STUDIES. LAW, LEGITIMACY AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS MARKING THE CEN-
TENARY OF DICEY'S LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 67 (P. McAuslan and J.McEldowney ed.
1985).
24. For a discussion of the theory of separation of powers, see W. GWYN, THE MEANING
OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AN ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE
ADOPTION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1965), notably at ch. I.
25. To some extent the arguments over the different meanings of the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers revolves around the debate between a preference for the United States presiden-
[Vol. 8:2
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terpretations of the theory, the one outstanding and common thread
to all interpretations of the separation of powers is the belief in the
separation and independence of the judiciary from the executive and
legislative branches of government. 6 The separation of powers is
seen as necessary to achieve liberty. The notion of liberty in this in-
stance is perceived in negative terms in that it essentially seeks to
weaken government.27 At the second level, constitutionalism amounts
to accountable government, holding of free elections, the existence of
pluralism in political organizations (multi-party political system),
and legal guarantees for civil liberties.28
Il1. Constitutionalism and its Political Ideology
The term constitutionalism today is the philosophical and legal
shell under which liberal democracy exists. The origins of modern
constitutionalism can be traced to liberalism and capitalism. Its
main focus is on the individual and individual rights which are the
libertarian aspects of the doctrine. This focus on individuality has
been attributed to Christianity, which eventually gave rise to the no-
tion of natural rights.30 Under ancient law, the constitution was seen
to be the mere enactment of the prince or emperor. In the modern
setting with the influence of natural law 1 the constitution derives its
validity from some higher law outside the prince and the constitu-
tion. This higher law could be fundamental law, the law of reason or
the law of God or nature.32 This higher law is today referred to as
natural law. Natural law provides a barrier beyond which the gov-
ernment should not penetrate. Natural law is stated as being in exis-
tence before positive law, and state law is derived from the former.
State violation of this natural law is illegitimate and void. 3
In order to understand natural law, clarification is required as
to what the natural law thinkers understood as the law of nature.
Although there are differences in opinion among natural law think-
ers as to the proper philosophical basis of the doctrine, they all share
some guiding threads. The first common and crucial guiding thread
tial system or the British parliamentary Westminster system of government. For a discussion
of the different meanings to the separation of powers, see G. MARSHAL, CONSTITUTIONAL THE-
ORY 97-100 (1971).
26. Id. at 103.
27. At times the weakening of government operates to the point where the government is
not able to fulfill many social and economic functions. See, e.g., M. VILE, supra note 21, at 14.
28. S. DESMITH, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH AND ITS CONSTITUTIONS 106 (1964).
29. C. FRIEDRICH, supra note 2, at 6.
30. Sigmund, Carl Friedrich's Contribution to the Theory of Constitutionalism-Com-
parative Government, in CONSTITUTIONALISM 37 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman ed. 1979) [here-
inafter CONSTITUTIONALISM].
31. Andrews, supra note 20, at 15.
32. See HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, supra note 11, at 28.
33. B.F. BROWN, THE NATURAL LAW READER 2 (1961).
Winter 19901
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is their focus on individualism and the protection of individual
rights.34 The second, yet no less important, and interrelated guiding
thread is the belief in and concern for the protection of private
property.3 5
The priority of the individual was seen to be derived from a
previous state of nature in which no prior group had existed. 36 Simi-
larly, private property was seen to exist in the pre-social state and it
was therefore also seen as a natural law not subjectable to modifica-
tion. 7 Today, the expression of these individual rights have come to
receive a particular descriptiven term, fundamental human rights.
The subject matter of these rights are essentially civil liberties38 and
economic freedom, the main component of which is the right to
property.3 9 The protection of property and individual rights is pro-
claimed to be beyond the encroachment of any government, and any
such encroachment would be considered a violation of the law of na-
ture. The protection of these rights has become part of the normative
structure of western societies.'
In the original state of nature, man's natural rights were subject
to a state of flux and invasion by others. In order to protect these
rights, man enters into a society and the formation of the state to
guarantee these natural rights."1 Similarly, Rousseau argues that
there were obstacles in the state of nature, and the human race
would have perished if they had continued in this state . 2 The enter-
ing into a society is referred to as the social contract which reflected
a concerted effort to protect natural rights.43 However, the social
contract theorists emphasize that the people were the possessors of
all political power, who have subsequently surrendered a part of it to
the state.'4 The part that it has surrendered to the state was the
power to prevent violent conflicts and the powers to protect natural
rights.
Since the social contract was formed to protect the natural or-
34. See generally J. LOCKE,.OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, Two TREATISES; see also, 0.
GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIETY 1500 TO 1800, at 96-8 (1957) [herein-
after 0. GIERKE].
35. F. NEUMANN, THE RULE OF LAW POLITICAL THEORY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN
MODERN SOCIETY 119 (1986) [hereinafter F. NEUMANN].
36. 0. GIERKE, supra note 34, at 96.
37. H. CAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL 359 (1949).
38. The main civil liberties are rights, such as the freedom of speech, assembly, move-
ment, press and political freedom.
39. F. NEUMANN, supra note 35, at 37.
40. In the United States, the protection of these rights is secured by the Bill of Rights.
41. Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Govern-
ment, SOCIAL CONTRACT, ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME AND ROUSSEAU 73 (Sir Ernest Barker
trans. 1960) [hereinafter SOCIAL CONTRACT].
42. Id. at 179.
43. Id. at 180.
44. 0. GIERKE, supra note 34, at 44-5.
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JURISPRUDENCE
der, it was deemed necessary to limit the powers of government and
prevent it from transgressing beyond the boundaries of natural law.
It was unthinkable to believe that man, on entering into a social con-
tract, would wish to be in a worse position by relinquishing his
equality, liberty and property. 45 The control of government is to be
effected by the other crucial doctrine in constitutionalism, namely,
the rule of law. The rule of law is an important doctrine in western
constitutional systems, and is used as a yardstick to judge whether a
political system is "just" and "free." 4 In Western systems, it is, in a
sense, "the symbol of the legitimating force of the whole notion of
constitutionality." 1
The main tenets of the rule of law are limited government in
terms of clear, preannounced rules of law.48 The second, and some-
what controversial, aspect to the rule of law is the actual limitation
of government power to do certain things.49 In the first instance,
whether an action is lawful depends on whether it conforms with
pre-existing rules. The point here is that there should not be any
punishment for an action which was not a crime when the act was
committed.5 ° According to Locke, in the state of nature, man did not
have arbitrary power. Now that part of this power has been relin-
quished to the legislature, this power cannot be exercised in an arbi-
trary manner. 5 Moreover, man entered into the social contract to
prevent fluxes and uncertainties. Hence, the law should be open and
clear so that people would be able to structure their actions
45. See Locke's essay in SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 41, at 75-82; see also Rous-
seau's essay in SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 41, at 197-8.
46. A. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION, ch. 7 (1961).
47. I, HARDEN & N. LEWIS, supra note 12, at 32.
48. F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 54 (1944). There are different interpretations to
the rule of law. Some favor the view that the rule of law is simply government according to
law. Others advance the view that the rule of law means both procedural and substantive
justice. See A. MATTHEWS, LAW. ORDER AND LIBERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA 1-20 (1972), for the
different notions of the rule of law. Matthews attempts to separate the notion of the rule of law
from natural law thinking, arguing that to link the rule of law with natural rights is to prefer a
political ideology. His argument and presentation of the Diceyian theory of the rule of law as a
value free theory is untenable. The Diceyian theory of the rule of law is value laden as it is
also premised on individual rights and the institution of private property - the two pillars of
natural law thinking.
49. See discussion, id. See also E. WADE & G. PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW 92 (1955) [hereinafter E. WADE & G. PHILLIPS]. In a sense, the linking of the
rule of law to limitation of government powers is to subsume the doctrine into constitutional-
ism. There are theorists who reject the association of the rule of law with "good" law or
substantive justice. See R. CUNNINGHAM, LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 3-4 (1979). To
theorists like Cunningham, the rule of law is limited to only the first definition. However,
under liberal systems it is generally appreciated that the two are mutually interdependent. E.
WADE & G. PHILLIPS at 90. In this study, the rule of law will be used in terms of the legality
and substantive justice notion which are accepted tenets of constitutionalism. The doctrine of
the rule of law in terms of the legality notion does not operate on its own, and has to be
considered with all the other tenets of constitutionalism in western liberal systems.
50. F. HAYEK, THE RULE OF LAW 12 (1975).
51. SOCIAL CONTRACT, supra note 41, at 79.
Winter 1990]
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accordingly.5"
IV. The Socio-Economic System and the Material Structure of
Law in the Liberal Order
The theory of law in the liberal systems is an outgrowth from
classical economic theory.53 Classical economic theory as enunciated
by Adam Smith is not practiced in its pure form despite growing
appeal. 54 The form of law is, however, related to the broad economic
philosophies of liberal societies. In its pure form, classical liberal ec-
onomic theory is best represented by the-writings of Smith,55 and by
its modern variant, Milton Friedman.5" The writings of Adam Smith
and the works of modern laissez faire theorists are based on natural
law and that which they consider to be the natural order of things.
Economic freedom is seen as a prerequisite for political freedom, and
the two can only exist under conditions of free competition.57 Every
individual should be permitted to conduct his affairs in an atmo-
sphere free of restraint and in doing so, all members of society will
benefit.
The cardinal emphasis is again individual rights and individual
property, the guaranteeing of which should be the main purpose of
government. Since the function of government is to act as an umpire
guaranteeing the requisite rights of individuals, these theorists find it
necessary to limit the power of government to fulfill only this pur-
pose. Consequently, the government must be given sufficient power
to fulfill this purpose and no more. In this sense, the government is
seen more as a necessary evil. 58 There is an ongoing conflict between
private and public existence, and the role of the state must be con-
fined to those areas identified as part of the public domain. 59 Among
the important government powers are those of defense, the protec-
tion of society from invasion by others, the administration of justice,
and the erection of certain public works to facilitate commerce in the
society.60 The dispersion of government power manifested in, among
other things, the separation of powers is designed to fragment gov-
ernment power so as not to go beyond its "necessary" purposes.
52. Id. at 80.
53. F. NEUMANN, supra note 35, at 189.
54. Both the United States under Ronald Reagan and Britain under Margaret Thatcher
are more committed to the principles of classical economics more than western countries have
ever been before. This has been reflected in their respective economic policies.
55. See the classic, A. SMITH, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (1937) [hereinafter A. SMITH].
56. See M. & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE A PERSONAL STATEMENT (1979).
57. Id. at 3.
58. Schochet, Constitutionalism, Liberalism and the Study of Politics, in CONSTITU-
TIONALISM 37 (1979).
59. Id.
60. A. SMITH, supra note 55, at ch. I.
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JURISPRUDENCE
The libertarian influence commits constitutionalism to the pres-
ervation of political liberty in terms of a particular conception favor-
ing liberty over equality.61 In the first instance, the government is
prohibited from doing certain things"2 which constitute the liberta-
rian aspects of the theory. A vital aspect of liberty is the protection
of the institution of private property which is tied to the notion of
individual rights. As part of the notion of individual rights, various
freedoms such as the freedom of speech and assembly are
championed.
Moreover, the institutional arrangements linked to constitution-
alism are viewed as auxiliary arrangements to protect the liberal in-
terests.6 The overall institutional arrangements and the notion of
liberty are essentially geared to weaken government and to promote
a negative conception of political liberty as imposing restraints on
government. Positive government, directed towards economic and so-
cial change, is viewed as acting against the principles of
constitutionalism. 6 4
The point has repeatedly been made regarding the supposed au-
tonomy of the law and the neutrality of institutions of the state.6"
Today, liberal theorists increasingly reject the notion of the neutral-
ity of state institutions. When institutions are designed to weaken
and limit the competencies of the government, the procedures
designed to achieve this function are clearly value charged." Once
introduced, the institutions of the state may operate in a neutral
manner, but they are merely the means to achieve the values deemed
essential. 7
V. Constitutional Law and Legality in Terms of Soviet Socialist
Doctrine
In order to understand the socialist thinking of constitution
making, one has to first formulate a conception of the Marxist ap-
proach to law. Such a task is not without difficulties because the
founding fathers of Marxism, Marx and Engels, did not treat the
law as a separate entity subject to specific analysis. It is, therefore,
61. K. WHEARE, supra note 4, at 137.
62. See the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution.
63. HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, supra note 11, at 35-36.
64. See Sartori, supra note 16, at 862. The author considers economic policies in the
constitution as frivolous and a move away from constitutional telos. For the view that the
positive government after the Great Depression was incompatible with the principles of consti-
tutionalism; see also HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, supra note 11, at 3.
65. For a discussion of law being autonomous from political processes, see Parsons, Evo-
lutionary Universals in Society, 29 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 353 (1964).
66. Kateb, Remarks on the Procedures of Constitutional Democracy, in CONSTITUTION-
ALISM 217 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman ed. 1979).
67. Id.
Winter 1990]
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quite common for Marxist thinkers to express that there is no Marx-
ist theory of law. 8 Not surprisingly, the Marxist approach to law
does not consist of a single theoretical perspective. According to
Ralph Milliband, the corpus of Marxism has a lot of limitations in
providing answers to issues of politics and political theory. Regard-
less of how much analysis of Marxist thoughts one conducts, it is
still difficult to achieve a "smooth, harmonious, consistent and un-
problematic Marxist political theory." 9 On the other hand, certain
writers, while conceding there is no conception of law in the works of
Marx and Engels, assert that there are sufficient concepts left by the
founding fathers in which a theory of law can be developed and put
forward.70
Marxist writers allude to the two polar versions of Marxism.7 1
The first version is a theory which sees all law as serving as instru-
ments of class rule.7 2 The second version sees the law as an extension
of liberalism and seeks to introduce the rule of law, separation of
powers and the other liberal rights into a socialist order. 3
A. Marxist Theory Against All Law
The first version is premised, to a great extent, on the Marxist
metaphor of base and superstructure, and the apparent conclusions
drawn from it. A much quoted passage in Marxist literature is
Marx's statement:
In the social production of their life, men enter into definite
relations that are indispensable and independent of their will,
relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of
development of their material productive forces. The sum total
of these relations of production constitutes the economic struc-
ture of society, the real foundation on which rises a legal and
political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms
of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life
conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in
general. It is not the consciousness of men that determine their
being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines
their consciousness. 4
68. R. MILLIBAND, MARXISM AND POLITICS 2-5 (1977) [hereinafter R. MILLIBAND];
GD. CAMERON. SOVIET LAWYER AND His SYSTEM 19 (Michigan International Business Stud-
ies 1978).
69. R. MILLIBAND, supra note 68, at 5.
70. M. CAIN & A. HUNT, MARX AND ENGELS ON LAW (1979).
71. B. FINE, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW: LIBERAL IDEALS AND MARXIST CRITI-
QUES I (1984) [hereinafter B. FINE].
72. H. COLLINS, MARXISM AND LAW (1982) [hereinafter H. COLLINS].
73. See the last ten pages of E. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE
BLACK ACT (1975) [hereinafter E. THOMPSON].
74. K. MARX, Preface to A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY,
quoted in R. MILLIBAND, supra note 68, at 15.
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The core interpretation of Marxists, drawing from the above
statement and other writings of Marx and Engels, has been to em-
phasize the primacy of the economic base. Accordingly, all social
institutions and political structures are seen to originate from, and
adapt themselves to the nature of the relations of production. Simi-
larly, the law is determined in content and form by the relations of
production and the material base.15 Overall, the material base is de-
terminative of all ideas, values, beliefs, superstitions and the law.
The law is, therefore, an epiphenomenon and part of the superstruc-
ture.7" This approach to law in fact turns to a theory against law and
the "principal aim of Marxist jurisprudence" then becomes "to criti-
cize the centerpiece of liberal political philosophy, the ideal called
the rule of law." 7
This classical Marxist approach to law deserves consideration
since it has certain important consequences flowing from it. The first
is the notion that all law is an instrument of class oppression, and
that the existence of law is necessary for the maintenance of capital-
ist society. This suggestion is drawn from a reading of Marx and
Engels that "the executive of the modern state is but a committee
for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. '7 8 All
law is viewed as representing or disguising the interests of the ruling
class. Law is considered the equivalent of terror and violence, and
the presence of law is associated with control.79 The police and
courts are similarly viewed as instruments of coercion to protect the
interests of the dominant class.8" This view is a negation of liber-
alism and views liberal notions, such as parliamentary democracy,
equality before the law, and the rule of law, as mere frauds which
disguise the brute realities of oppression and exploitation. The task
of socialist theorists, therefore, is to demystify the law and expose its
harsh realities.
In a true communist society, there will be no state and no law,
as evidenced by the famous Marxist slogan "the withering away of
the state." The state is the instrument whereby the oppression of the
majority is maintained. In a communist society, social relations
75. H. COLLINS, supra note 72, at 19.
76. Mollnau, The Dynamics Of The Object of Legal Regulation and Legality Under
Socialism, in LEGAL THEORY COMPARATIVE LAW STUDIES IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR IMRE
SZABO 277 (Z. Peteri ed. 1984) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE LAW STUDIES].
77. H. COLLINS, supra note 72, at 1, 12. The interpretation that Collins and most Marx-
ist writers give to the rule of law is in terms of the legality principle, i.e., that power should be
exercised according to preannounced rules which should be known to all. The law applies to all
alike and there need be no particular content to the law.
78. K. MARX & F. ENGELS, The Communist Manifesto, in I MARX AND ENGELS: SE-
LECTED WORKS 110-11 (1973).
79. N. POULANTZAS, STATE, POWER, SOCIALISM 76-92 (1978) [hereinafter N.
POULANTZAS].
80. Gordon, Class and Economics of Crime, 3 REV. OF RADICAL ECON. 52-70 (1971).
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would have changed so much that there would be no need for law,
and work would be performed in a cooperative manner by a popula-
tion living in harmony. 8' According to this conception, the presence
of law is not compatible with a communist society, and those socie-
ties that have the plethora of laws and regulations cannot be cor-
rectly labelled as a communist society. 8 The presence of law in
those countries, which claim to be communist, is attributed to a need
to maintain the repressive system.
There are several twentieth century Marxist theorists who aim
to locate the presence of law specifically at a capitalist society. The
first renowned theorist is E. Pashukanis.83 Pashukanis' views are
based on the writings of Marx and Engels centering on the decay of
law. Law for Pashukanis is a manifestation of capitalism, because it
reflects the fetish for commodities. Therefore, in a socialist order,
there cannot be socialist law, because in the new order commodity
relations will be abolished."' Pashukanis defines "law" in terms of
"subject" and "right." The law essentially amounts to a recognition
of the rights of subjects concerning possessions. Law is necessary be-
cause it is vital to the system of production, and it is through law
that the system of production is regulated.8 In this scheme of things,
law is conceived in property rights and capitalist-socialist relations.
The popular liberal view sees the presence of law in society as a
neutral institutional arrangement whereby conflict can be resolved,
as opposed to the imposition of a specific ideology. Hence, in the
liberal conception, law - influenced by natural rights - is equated
with justice and not influenced by any material forces. The Marxist
view of law rejects the autonomy of legal reasoning, and the notion
of law having an inherent logic of its own. Drawing on the base and
superstructure metaphor, law is seen to be materially determined by
the relations of production.86 Consequently, the law, as part of the
superstructure, cannot be an independent influence on social behav-
ior. The rejection of law as an autonomous entity has profound con-
sequences. According to this view, the relations of production require
primary consideration, with the legal considerations taking a second-
ary role.
81. V. LENIN, THE STATE AND REVOLUTION (1932), notably ch. 5 [hereinafter V.
LENIN].
82. H. COLLINS, supra note 72, at 2.
83. The following discussion of Pashukanis' views are taken from his work THE GEN-
ERAL THEORY OF LAW AND MARXISM, reprinted in N. PASHUKANIS: SELECTED WRITINGS ON
MARXISM AND LAW (P. Beirne & R. Sharlet eds. and trans. 1980).
84. Id. at 273-4.
85. Id.
86. H. COLLINS, supra note 72, at 68-9.
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B. Marxist Theory in Favor of Legality
The second polar version of Marxist theory shares several simi-
larities with liberalism, namely its commitment to the rule of law.
The leading Marxist proponent in favor of the rule of law is the
English writer E. Thompson,8 7 who asserts that the rule of law is "an
unqualified human good" in the sense that it "imposes effective inhi-
bitions upon power."8 8 For Thompson, the rule of law is the opposite
to arbitrary power and is a value worth preserving. In a sense, law is
looked on as defining the relations of production,89 which is a major
point of departure from the classical Marxist approach.
This approach applauds the achievement of liberal thought such
as the rule of law and the maintenance of civil liberties and sees a
democratic character in law and state power. The argument has
been expressed more forcefully - that all states having public func-
tion purposes need to have public law. In a socialist system where
there is greater state involvement in the public sphere, there is a
greater need for a legal framework of public law. Constitutional re-
straints on state authority are seen as essential and the notion of the
withering away of the state is viewed as unattainable. 0 Many coun-
tries claim the socialist mantle and do have state constitutions. Ac-
cording to these theorists, the problem with these states and their
constitutions is the absence of a framework that limits the power of
the state agencies. 91
C. Overview
In summarizing the two major versions of the Marxist approach
to law, one sees merit in the rule of law while the other perspective
looks at all liberal practices and civil rights as a sham to disguise the
practices of bourgeois liberalism. Law is equated with oppression
and all institutions are seen as part of the overall coercive machin-
ery. The question of whether law is essential for the maintenance of
the fabric of any society has become contentious.
To be true to classical Marxism, the presence of law is inconsis-
tent with the ultimate stage of society where the state would wither
away. In the writings of Marx, it appears that he foresaw the neces-
sity for the retention of liberal rights only in the transition period.9 2
These liberal rights were important principles in the transformation
87. See E. THOMPSON, supra note 73.
88. Id. at 266.
89. Thompson states that law "is deeply imbricated within the very basis of productive
relations." Id. at 261.
90. P. HURST, LAW, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 85 (1986).
91. Id. at 86.
92. SOVIET INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES INSIDE VIEWS 32 (W.G. Andrews ed. 1966)
[hereinafter SOVIET INSTITUTIONS].
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of the society.93 This paradox poses serious questions which have to
be resolved. On the one hand, there is the assertion of the withering
away of law and the smashing of the bourgeois state, while on the
other hand, there is a demand for the preservation of bourgeois
rights in the transformation period. Furthermore, there are theorists
such as Thompson who regard the rule of law as "an unqualified
human good."
The polar versions of Marxist attitudes to law is a reflection, to
a certain extent, of this paradox, with each side basing its tenets on
apparently conflicting interpretations. The reality is that Communist
countries have greater state involvement in the activities of people,
hence, the greater need for legal regulation. In reality, none of the
Soviet-bloc countries pay lip service to the notion of the rule of law,
in fact, most of them reject it.
In terms of orthodox theory, the state and law were only to be
temporary phenomena, 4 yet the communist state in the Soviet
Union has been in existence for some sixty years. This has called for
rationalization and justification for the presence of law in these soci-
eties. Consequently, due to the presence of law in these societies, the
ideological tenets of law and the purpose it serves must be examined.
According to present Marxist theorists, the answer to this para-
dox is to be found in the content and form of law in a new social
context. The form of law is related to the relations of production,
and the changing relations of production is interconnected to the
forms of law.9" In any social arrangement there is a need for rules to
coordinate man's behavior. This is particularly so in a country which
believes in central planning and central direction of economic and
social affairs.
According to the latter day -theorists, however, the present rules
have to be distinguished from rules which exist to inhibit freedom
which underlies the link between rules and the new social context. In
the political sense, the state is still preserved, but in the communist
order, they argue it is not a "coercive" state superimposed upon soci-
ety.96 Modern theorists argue that in a communist society the state is
merged with society, and state functions become social functions, 97
as opposed to a liberal society which seeks a separation between
state and individual. In this sense, the law is more a form of social
regulation operating in a context where there are no antagonistic in-
93. B. FINE, supra note 71, at 125.
94. V. LENIN, supra note 81. The relevant part of Lenin's views are also quoted in So-
VIET INSTITUTIONS, supra note 92, at 26, 33.
95. B. FINE, supra note 71, at 44.
96. R. SELUCKY, MARXISM, SOCIALISM, FREEDOM 110 (1979).
97. SOVIET INSTITUTIONS, supra note 92, at 53.
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terests, and not an entity separated from the society.98 This questions
the notion of the withering away of the state, or the correct interpre-
tation of the withering away of the state.
There will always be a need to perform public functions and to
organize the division of labor. In this sense, there is a recognition of
the organizing functions of law in a constitution.9" As long as these
needs persist, the Marxist criticism of all laws or legal systems, per
se, is without basis. ' It is important to note that these rationaliza-
tions are all ex-post facto, and that under orthodox-Marxism there
would ultimately be no need for a constitution, law or other forms of
regulation.'
VI. The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and the Notion of the
Rule of Law in the Soviet System
The Soviet constitutional system does not fathom any notion of
constitutionalism and separation of powers to act as a break on the
government or party." 2 The general spirit is that there should be a
unity of state authority from top to bottom. 3 Since the government
views the people as the source of all power, and the elected repre-
sentatives to the legislature are chosen by the people, there is no
need for a separation of powers. As the people are the source of all
power, there can be no limitation on the -power of the people to 'act
as represented by their legislature, the Supreme Soviet.
In terms of orthodox theory, the notion of separation of powers
was an insufficient compromise between the legislature and the bu-
reaucracy which had the effect of freeing the executive from popular
control.'04 An independent judiciary with the ability to question an
act of the legislature would negate the principle of the sovereignty of
the people.' °6 Accordingly, the legislature has to be supreme at all
times, and giving the courts a testing power is viewed as bringing the
courts into the political process.106
Since the central government owns all the land, there is no de-
marcation of power between the center and the periphery. Moreover,
the ideology of Soviet socialism sees the unity of economic and polit-
ical systems as an important aspect of the authority of the state, and
98. COMPARATIVE LAW STUDIES, supra note 76, at 309.
99. I. KOVACS, supra note 4, at 17.
100. H. COLLINS, supra note 72, at 122.
101. V. LENIN, supra note 81.
102. The role of the party in Soviet society is beyond this jurisprudential inquiry.
103. A. VYSHINSKY, THE LAW OF THE SOVIET STATE 300 (1948).
104. B. FINE, supra note 71, at 123.
105. J. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW A SEARCH FOR THE COMMON CORE OF
THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE MARXIAN SOCIALIST STATES 42 (1969) [hereinafter J. HAZARD].
106. Osakwe, Equal Protection of Law in Soviet Constitutional Law and Theory-A
Comparative Analysis, 59 TUL. L. REV. 981 (1985) [hereinafter Equal Protection of Law].
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there can be no different "centers" of power. Central direction of
economic affairs is a fundamental tenet of Soviet socialism.
There may be division of tasks and functions, but these have to
be performed in terms of fixed mandates given by the elected repre-
sentatives. This is a significant point of departure from western con-
stitutional systems. One can see the delegation of power by the Su-
preme Soviet (the Soviet legislature) to the Presidium (the collective
head of state), and the further delegation by the Presidium to the
Council of Ministers (the equivalent of the cabinet)." 7
Under the Soviet system, there are no popularly elected officials
such as mayors, governors or a president, signifying the negative at-
titude towards individual leadership. Everything is conducted in
committee or assembly where decisions can be reached in a collective
manner.1 0 8 Those persons with titles are, in fact, spokespersons for
the respective assemblies or communes chosen by the various forums
under party supervision.109
In terms of Marxist ideology, the representatives of the people
should not be full time or professional representatives, but should
come from the ordinary-ranks of working people.110 The delegates
should represent the people and then return to their normal lives.
The effect is that the legislature does not sit for long periods of
time."' For this reason, there has to be a permanent organ of state
power functioning in the periods when the legislature is not in ses-
sion. This results in the delegation, as opposed to the separation, of
power by the legislature to the Presidium, with the latter having all
the powers that the Supreme Soviet has while not in session." 2
The Soviet system does, however, have a system of courts in
which its judges are popularly elected. The purpose of the court is to
decide on matters in a flexible way with greater emphasis on political
affairs in the spirit of a "socialist conscience," '1 3 rather than adopt-
ing a "legal" approach, as used by western systems. Flexibility in the
law is an important aspect of the Soviet system; however, the judges
are not free to interpret the law in terms of their own conceptions.
The judges should merely interpret the intention of the Legisla-
ture."' Invariably, most judges are members of the Communist
107. Id. at 975.
108. Pravda, Apr. 16, 1953, at 2, translated and republished in SOVIET INSTITUTIONS,
supra note 92, at 113.
109. J. HAZARD, supra note 105, at 43.
110. The majority of deputies come from within the ranks of workers and peasants. See
J. HOUGH & M. FAINSOD, HOW THE SOVIET UNION IS GOVERNED 364-5 (1979).
Ill. Current talks of reform under Gorbachev aims at reforming this and making the
legislature a more permanent body.
112. Osakwe, The Theories and Realities of Modern Soviet Constitutional Law, 127 U.
PA. L. REV. 1416-17.(1978).
113. J. HAZARD; supra note 105, at 90-1.
114. In this regard the party exerts considerable control. See Feldbrugge, Law and Po-
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party.1 15 In keeping with the communal orientation of Soviet ideol-
ogy, cases are held collegially with lay assessors, who are essentially
ordinary people, sitting with the judges.
The rule of law, particularly the need for certainty in the law -
the cornerstone of Western constitutional systems - has no place in
Soviet constitutional doctrine. The contrary principle of flexibility in
the law is the operative notion."' The idea of law as representing
eternal justice is rejected, and law is seen as something which can
and should constantly change to achieve the goals of society. Law is
integrally related to the society, and in a society where there is cen-
tral direction, the purpose of legislation is to transform the political
programs into legal processes." 7
The constitution cannot be a rigid document if it is to serve as a
framework for social change. The Soviets interpret the constitutions
of western systems as being designed to protect certain interests as
opposed to being a framework within which socio-economic change is
achieved. Consequently, the prevailing notion of constitutions in the
Soviet-bloc countries is that every time there is a change in the state,
there has to be constitutional amendments or changes to take ac-
count of the transformation." ' However, there is a problem with al-
tering the constitution every time it is believed that social values
have changed. This will involve a great deal of legislative activity
and instability in the society. The result has been to provide the
higher organs of state power, namely the cabinet represented in the
Council of Ministers, with a discretionary power to adopt plans of
regulation." 9
VII. The Role of a Constitution in a Socialist Order
A constitution can contain two primary sets of provisions:
namely, the main offices of state, such as the machinery of govern-
ment, and second, the ideological basis of the political system. The
first requirement must be present in all systems.'2 0 However, it is
against the background of the Marxist approach to law and the gen-
eral conclusion that a legal system is necessary that the question
posed, what function does a constitution serves in a socialist order?
litical Dissent in the Soviet Union, CONTEMPORARY SOVIET LAW 55-68 (D. Barry & G. Gins-
burg ed. 1974).
115. The broader role of the Communist party and its all-encompassing supervision over
all aspects of Soviet society is beyond the scope of this enquiry.
116. J. HAZARD, supra note 105, at 81.
117. COMPARATIVE LAW STUDIES, supra note 76, at 314.
118. Aspaturian, The Theory and Practice of Soviet Federalism, 12 J. POL. 41, 42
(1950).
119. COMPARATIVE LAW STUDIES, supra note 76, at 282.
120. Brick, Four African Constitutions: Two Models, 14 GOV'T & OPPOSITION 340
(1979).
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This question has parallels with the differences surfacing be-
tween a constitution and the notion of constitutionalism in liberal
systems. The debate has been formulated in terms of a preference
for whether a constitution should be "state law" or "constitutional
law."'' According to the former preference, the constitution is
meant only to reflect "the structure of state power" and merely per-
forms "a codification function, recording and legitimating the
changes in state structure as they occur.' 22 On the other hand, the
"constitutional law" school argues against the reduction of a consti-
tution to a mere outline of an institutional structure and for a nor-
mative content. The constitution is viewed as a legal instrument
which should define the social order.123 The latter should be reflec-
tive and programmatic, incorporating ideological goals and
policies. 2 '
The preference in the socialist order is to consider the constitu-
tion explicitly as a political charter detailing the objectives which the
government should seek to achieve. There has to be unity between
the constitution and party program, with the party enforcing its
changes through the constitution.2 5 In this sense, the constitution is
more overtly a political document as opposed to merely a legal docu-
ment.' This line of reasoning is consistent with the overall socialist
notion of unity of economic and political systems as an aspect of the
state.
VIII. Conclusion
Under western systems, the tendency is to be restrictive when
drawing up constitutions, since the constitution is not seen as an in-
strument for socio-economic change. The dominant view has been
that a constitution should be a legal document with political consid-
erations lying outside the realm of constitutional law. The notion
that law and socio-economic factors are unrelated is untenable.
What is termed justice is not some metaphysical entity arrived at
through reason and popular consent, but it is inextricably linked to
the socio-economic environment of which it is a part. 127 However,
the constitution as the "rules of the game," in terms of which gov-
121. R. SHARLET, THE NEW SOVIET CONSTITUTION OF 1977: ANALYSIS AND TEXT 8
(1978) [hereinafter R. SHARLET].
122. Id. at 8-9.
123. 1. KOVACS, supra note 4, at 71-72.
124. R. SHARLET, supra note 121, at 8.
125. Schuster, Politics and Law in the Period of Progressing towards an Advanced So-
cialist Society, in COMPARATIVE LAW STUDIES, in supra note 76, at 390-1.
126. Equal Protection of Law, supra note 106, at 978.
127. See C. BJEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 8 (1913). In his classic work, Beard attempts to locate the founding of the
United States Constitution in terms of the needs of the property class.
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ernment power is to be exercised, is not amenable to easy changes
and fluxes. Certainty in the law represented by the notion of the rule
of law is an important aspect of western jurisprudence.
A preference for a limited government is a political choice for a
liberal socio-economic system with strong ideological connotations.
In terms of liberal doctrine the ambit of political authority should be
restricted to the limits defined in the constitution, and the fundamen-
tal rights defined should not be invaded.12 The doctrine of constitu-
tionalism explains the philosophical basis of a constitution under lib-
eral systems. The institutional arrangements are designed for the
protection of individual rights and property. The institutional struc-
tures created are designed to enhance the values which certain mem-
bers of society hold to be important. Over a period of time, the insti-
tutions under western systems have come to assume a so-called
independent and separate existence. We see this in the importance
attached to the separation of powers and the independence of the
judiciary.
From a historical point of view, the emergence of these institu-
tions can be located within the socio-economic system in which it
exists. Today, with the "rules of the game," namely, liberal society
firmly entrenched, there is no need to overtly intervene and con-
stantly manipulate the institutions of state. In this sense, the consti-
tution and the institutions which are instrumental in achieving the
goals of society have become part of the psycho-sociological complex,
and, therefore, have assumed an important "independent" value.129
In terms of orthodox Marxist political theory, law is part of the
oppressive structure of the state designed to exert control over soci-
ety. However, control and planning have become primary aspects of
Soviet society which call for a rationalization and basis for state law
in Soviet society. Today, Soviet jurists acknowledge the need for so-
cial norms to regulate human behavior, but distinguish their state
from capitalist states as one not having antagonistic classes or inter-
ests. 130 The Soviet state is presented as not representing class inter-
ests. The constitutional law and its regulations are put forward as
representing the collective interests of the society. Consequently,
constitutional law under Soviet communism regards the purpose of
the state as an active agent in the socio-economic transformation of
society. In this respect, it does not intend to place fetters on the abil-
ity of the government to act towards this goal. Unlike liberal theory,
it does not accept any notion of a separation between law and socio-
128. H. LASKI, THE RISE OF LIBERALISM THE PHILOSOPHY OF A BUSINESS CIVILIZATION
6 (1936).
129. W. LIVINGSTON, FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 7-8 (1956).
130. COMPARATIVE LAW STUDIES, supra note 76, at 309.
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economic policy. Similarly, it does not see any intrinsic value in the
rule of law or in the notion that law should be certain. Since the
purpose of law is merely to provide the framework to effect the
socio-economic change in "the interests of the masses," the law
should be amenable to change to meet evolving conditions. Under
western systems, the constitution invariable has to be of a rigid char-
acter and not pliable to suit political and economic expediencies, or
else it violates "the bedrock of constitutionalism. ' '13 1
131. B. NWABUEZE, supra note 17, at 9.
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